Xi Jinping's Next Challenge: Reconstructing a Purged PLA Command

The recent upheaval within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) represents one of the most significant shifts in Chinese military governance since the Mao era. President Xi Jinping, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has systematically dismantled the leadership of the PLA Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department over the past two years. While framed as an anti-corruption drive, the "wiping out" of these commands has left a profound structural void that Xi must now fill to ensure the military's combat readiness by the 2027 centenary goal. This reconstruction is not merely a personnel shuffle; it is a fundamental recalibration of the power dynamics at the heart of the Chinese state.

The scale of the purge has been unprecedented in the modern era. High-profile figures, including former Defense Minister Li Shangfu and top generals within the strategic missile forces, have vanished from public life or been formally stripped of their titles. This vacuum is not merely administrative; it is technical and strategic. The Rocket Force is the cornerstone of China’s nuclear deterrent and its "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) strategy in the Pacific. Rebuilding this command requires more than just appointing loyalists; it requires finding leaders who possess the technical sophistication to manage China’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal while remaining ideologically aligned with the "Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military."

“

President Xi Jinping, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has systematically dismantled the leadership of the PLA Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department over the past two years.

Industry analysts suggest that the reconstruction phase will prioritize political reliability over traditional meritocracy. This "red over expert" approach carries inherent risks. If the new command structure is composed primarily of political loyalists, the PLA’s ability to execute complex, multi-domain joint operations—necessary for any potential action regarding Taiwan—could be compromised. However, from Xi’s perspective, a competent but disloyal military poses a greater existential threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than a slightly less efficient but entirely subservient one. The challenge lies in balancing these two requirements without degrading the operational effectiveness that billions of dollars in modernization have bought.