4 Countries, 7 Entities Sanctioned Over Iran Drone Procurement Network

For the space and defense sector, these sanctions highlight the critical role of dual-use aerospace components in Iran’s drone arsenal. With entities in Iran, Nigeria, Italy, and Russia implicated, the IRGC’s ability to acquire sensitive avionics and airframe parts faces a direct hit—potentially slowing the proliferation of UAVs used to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. Treasury Department on July 16, 2026, imposed sanctions on an international network of individuals and companies spanning Iran, Nigeria, Italy, and Russia, accusing them of supporting weapons procurement for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The action, announced by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, underscores the Trump administration’s escalating maximum pressure campaign against Tehran following a series of Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

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In Russia, two individuals at Moscow-based aviation transport company Avratek—Mariya Vladimirovna Selina, head of the financial department, and Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin—provided logistical and travel support to Namazi’s operations.

The network’s linchpin is Behrouz Namazi, an Iranian national who serves as general director of Tehran-based Nika Jet Company—a firm ostensibly providing aircraft parts and drone services. According to the Treasury, Namazi actively sought weapons for the IRGC. Nigeria-based Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited acted as an intermediary, while Italian national Dounia Ettaib, operating out of Milan, handled procurement. In Russia, two individuals at Moscow-based aviation transport company Avratek—Mariya Vladimirovna Selina, head of the financial department, and Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin—provided logistical and travel support to Namazi’s operations. This geographically dispersed structure illustrates the IRGC’s reliance on front companies and proxies in neutral or allied jurisdictions to circumvent existing arms embargoes.

The sanctions were issued under the same executive authority that earlier targeted the IRGC over its ballistic missile program, and they align with National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 aimed at denying resources to the corps. The designations immediately block all property and interests in property of the named entities and individuals that are within U.S. jurisdiction or controlled by U.S. persons. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with them, and foreign financial institutions face secondary sanctions risk if they facilitate significant transactions for these targets. This legal architecture extends the enforcement reach well beyond American borders, pressuring banks and businesses in third countries to sever ties or risk losing access to the U.S. financial system.

The timing is critical. On July 12, Iranian forces or proxies launched attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption transits. These assaults disrupted shipping and raised insurance premiums, amplifying concerns about energy security. Bessent linked the sanctions directly to President Trump’s demand that Iran denuclearize, framing the network takedown as part of a broader effort to choke off the funding and supply chains that sustain Iran’s “war machine.”

The implications are multifaceted. For Iran’s military apparatus, the loss of key procurement nodes in aviation and drone sectors could delay development of indigenous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and precision-guided munitions. Nika Jet’s drone services and Avratek’s transportation logistics suggest the network specialized in moving dual-use components—a persistent weakness in global export-control regimes. Disruption at this level may force the IRGC to seek alternative, less reliable suppliers, increasing costs and detection risk.