Iran’s Power Vacuum: IRGC and Assembly of Experts Navigate Leadership Crisis

The sudden decapitation of Iran’s top leadership has plunged the Islamic Republic into a period of acute constitutional and security uncertainty. With the Supreme Leader and key executive figures removed from the board, the immediate focus shifts to the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Historically, the Iranian system is designed for continuity, yet the simultaneous loss of its ideological and administrative heads during a period of active conflict with the United States creates a volatile environment where the traditional rules of succession may be bypassed by military necessity.

The constitutional framework dictates that the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of clerics, must convene to select a new Supreme Leader. However, the influence of the IRGC cannot be overstated. As the primary custodian of Iran’s defense infrastructure, including its ballistic missile arsenal and nuclear program, the Guard is likely to act as the kingmaker. In the short term, the IRGC’s priority will be internal stabilization—a euphemism for suppressing domestic dissent and ensuring that the Axis of Resistance remains operational. For defense analysts, the critical metric is whether the IRGC moves toward a more overt form of military rule or continues to operate behind a clerical facade.

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With the Supreme Leader and key executive figures removed from the board, the immediate focus shifts to the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The implications for regional security are profound. Iran’s proxy network, spanning Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq, relies on a centralized command structure often tied directly to the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Quds Force. A leadership vacuum in Tehran could lead to proxy drift, where local commanders take more aggressive or autonomous actions, potentially dragging the region into a broader conflagration. Conversely, a weakened center might struggle to fund these groups, leading to a temporary contraction of Iranian influence across the Middle East.

From a defense-tech perspective, the transition period puts Iran’s strategic assets at risk. The command-and-control (C2) protocols for Iran’s missile forces are likely under the direct supervision of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force. During a leadership transition, the red line for deployment becomes blurred. Western intelligence agencies are undoubtedly monitoring for any shifts in the readiness of the Shahab and Fattah missile batteries, as well as any acceleration in uranium enrichment activities that might be used as leverage by a new regime seeking to consolidate power.