Deep-sea cable cutter: A 21st-century nuclear deterrent — 17 nations scramble, US & China absent

For defense strategists, the weaponization of the seabed marks a new frontier in hybrid warfare. The revelation that China possesses a deep-sea cable cutter capable of severing global internet arteries adds a destabilizing element to maritime security, demanding a rethink of deterrence theory. With 17 nations now collaborating on defense, the absence of the US and China signals a fragmented global response.

In a striking interview, RETN CEO Tony O’Sullivan has equated the psychological impact of deep-sea cable cutting technology to that of nuclear weapons, framing it as a tool of deterrence rather than immediate mass destruction. Speaking from Hong Kong, O’Sullivan emphasized that the essence of the threat lies not in the act of severing undersea communication arteries but in the unease and disruption their vulnerability creates among governments and populations. This perspective comes amid growing geopolitical tensions over seabed infrastructure, following the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and China’s development of a dedicated deep-sea cable cutter. Meanwhile, 17 Asian and European nations have recently intensified collaboration on defensive strategies to protect submarine cables—yet notably, the world’s two largest naval powers, China and the United States, remain outside this cooperative framework.

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This perspective comes amid growing geopolitical tensions over seabed infrastructure, following the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and China’s development of a dedicated deep-sea cable cutter.

The global internet’s physical backbone is a vast network of submarine fiber-optic cables spanning an estimated 1.5 million kilometers (932,000 miles). These cables carry the vast majority of intercontinental data traffic, underpinning everything from financial transactions to military communications. Yet the International Cable Protection Committee reports that 150 to 200 faults occur annually, with 70–80% caused by accidental human activities like commercial fishing and ship anchors, while the remainder stem from abrasion, equipment failure, and natural hazards. State-sponsored sabotage, though a recognized risk, remains statistically overshadowed by mundane accidents. O’Sullivan’s intervention reframes the discussion: the real danger is not a catastrophic mass cable cut, but the psychological warfare inherent in the threat itself. “It is about creating an unease in a population with the threat that something might actually happen, and therefore disturbing their normal operations of government or political system,” he said.

This psychological dimension aligns with hybrid warfare doctrines, where non-kinetic tools are used to destabilize without triggering full-scale conflict. A deep-sea cable cutter becomes a strategic asset not for its destructive potential, but for its ability to undermine confidence in global connectivity—much like a nuclear arsenal deters through the mere promise of retaliation. For O’Sullivan, the greater vulnerability is “naivety about network design,” implying that many operators lack sufficient redundancy and resilience to withstand targeted attacks or even widespread accidental damage. His comments underscore a critical shift: the seabed has become a new front in great-power competition, with the weaponization of infrastructure posing complex challenges for international law, trade, and security.